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On 9 September 1924, toward the end of a long, drawn-out strike of Filipino 
sugar workers in Hawai'i, 'the police shot dead sixteen strikers in what later 
came to be known as the "Hanapçpç Massacre," losing four among its own 
ranks by the end of the violent confrontation.1 Edward Beechert (1985:222) 
writes: 
Who or what precipitated the violence is not known. The special 
deputies, armed with hunting rifles and positioned above the 
exit road on a bluff, fired repeatedly into the massed strikers, 
killing sixteen and wounding others. Four policemen were killed 
in the melee. One hundred and sixty-one strikers were rounded 
up and jailed. Subsequently, seventy-six Filipinos were indicted 
for rioting; fifty-seven others pled guilty to charges of assault 
and battery. A single counsel was provided for the seventy-two 
men tried and convicted. The county attorney was assisted by 
two special deputy attorney generals hired and paid for by the 
HSPA [Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association].2 
Marking one of the bloodiest days in U.S. labor history, this one incident in 
Hanapçpç, on the island of Kaua'i, accounts for over six percent of all strike-
related deaths in twentieth-century United States (Jackman 2002:399). 
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As reproachful as it may appear in retrospect, the incident did not arouse 
contemporary public censure nor bring into question the legitimacy of the 
coercive agents or their actions. While scores of the strikers were arrested, tried, 
and convicted, no charges were ever brought against the police. In fact, there is 
no evidence that doing so was ever seriously considered. Furthermore, the police 
violence and its unquestioned legitimacy, though noted and described, have not 
been explained by historians and other social scientists.3 Far from unique to this 
particular incident, or to Hawai'i, there is a general lack of a theoretical 
understanding of legitimate state violence in the social sciences. 
This paper attempts to explain how physical violence can be perpetrated 
legitimately, in the case of the Hanapçpç Massacre and in general. First, I propose 
a rethinking of Pierre Bourdieu's concept of symbolic violence. The concept 
and Bourdieu's theory of social order and domination in which it is situated 
provide a powerful vocabulary and a productive starting point for analyzing 
legitimate acts of physical violence by the state. In particular, his writings on 
the state bring together and provide suggestive linkages between symbolic 
violence, physical violence, and legitimacy. At the same time, they raise a number 
of questions that call for reconsidering and retooling the concept of symbolic 
violence. Incorporating W.E.B. Du Bois's notion of double consciousness, I 
propose a reconceptualization that better explains the possibility of legitimate 
physical violence. Second, examining the Hanapçpç Massacre, I analyze how 
racial, and gendered, symbolic violence made possible and legitimate the deadly 
use of physical violence against Filipino working-class men. 
Reconceptualizing Symbolic Violence 
Bourdieu (1994:3; emphasis in original) defines the state as that institution 
"which successfully claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical and 
symbolic violence over a definite territory and over the totality of the 
corresponding population," emphasizing, in italics, his point of departure from 
Max Weber's classic formulation.4 The definition establishes a link between 
symbolic violence—his innovative and widely cited concept—and physical 
violence. It also raises a number of questions. How does symbolic violence 
relate to the notion of legitimacy? What exactly is the theoretical link between 
symbolic violence and physical violence, aside from their supposedly common 
claimant? How does the state successfully claim a monopoly of the legitimate 
use of symbolic violence? 
"A gentle violence, imperceptible and invisible even to its victims," symbolic 
violence, according to Bourdieu (2001:1), operates in the realm of doxa, the 
typical condition of correspondence between a social order and agents' 
internalized dispositions of perception, appreciation, and action structured by 
and thus adapted to that very social order. The correspondence makes the social 
world appear natural, even to those who fare badly in it. Symbolic violence 
refers to this tacit acceptance of oppression by the oppressed: "doxic submission 
Symbolic and Physical Violence 109 
of the dominated to the structures of a social order of which their mental structures 
are the product" (1994:14). It is the unconscious consent that the dominated 
give, or cannot but give, to the relation of domination because they, as well as 
the dominant, take the established social order for granted (Bourdieu 2000:170). 
For example, as Bourdieu (2001:35) points out with respect to gender domination 
in contemporary France, most women profess to wanting a husband who is older 
and taller than themselves. 
Although Bourdieu retains the word "legitimate" from Weber's definition 
of the state, it is somewhat redundant, because symbolic violence is meant to 
address the issue of legitimacy.5 Again, Bourdieu (1994:14; see also 2000:177) 
contrasts his own position to that of Weber: "The recognition of legitimacy is 
not, as Weber believed, a free act of clear conscience. It is rooted in the immediate, 
prereflexive, agreement between objective structures and embodied structures, 
now turned unconscious." That is, our mental structures internalize, or embody, 
objective social structures, through gradual inculcation, thereby rendering them 
homologous, mutually reinforcing, and unconscious. In modern, differentiated 
societies, the state effects this prereflexive agreement by "incarnatfing] itself 
simultaneously in objectivity, in the form of specific organizational structures 
and mechanisms, and in subjectivity in the form of mental structures and 
categories of perception and thought" (Bourdieu 1994:4; see also 2000). For 
example, prototypical among state institutions, the educational system legitimates 
class domination, among dominant and dominated classes alike, by transforming 
the inherited economic and cultural advantages of the children of the dominant 
classes—through ostensibly disinterested, meritocratic practices that align with 
and favor those advantages—into universally recognized academic advantages 
and credentials that reproduce their dominant class positions (Bourdieu 1996; 
Bourdieu and Passeron 1911).6 
No doubt, Bourdieu is right to attenuate the realm of consciousness in the 
reproduction of relations of domination. The "paradox of doxa" is that so little 
of the established order is questioned (Bourdieu 2001:1). Shifting the point of 
contention between Marxism and its critics, he writes, "In the notion of false 
consciousness that [Marxism] invokes to account for effects of symbolic 
domination, that superfluous term is 'consciousness'" (1994:14). How 
(un)consciously the dominated give their "active consent" (Gramsci 1971:244) 
to the established order is also, according to Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992), 
the point of distinction between symbolic violence and hegemony. Although the 
distinction is probably overdrawn—since one of the signal merits of Antonio 
Gramsci's concept, particularly in relation to antecedent Marxist theories of 
ideology, is that it does not refer only to a "conscious system of ideas and beliefs" 
(Williams 1977:109; see also Bourdieu and Eagleton 1994; Eagleton 1991)— 
Bourdieu undoubtedly places much more emphasis on the tacit in legitimating 
relations of domination, quite radically "reducing that of . . . consciousness" 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:25). While he allows for a delimited realm of 
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conscious conflicts and disagreements, much of what constitutes relations of 
domination "belongs to the order of belief and thus goes unquestioned (Bourdieu 
1994:14; emphasis in original).7 
The term itself derives its rhetorical force, in part, from its jarringly 
oxymoronic pairing of "symbolic" and "violence," disturbing commonsensical 
boundaries of what violence is and bridging the often, if falsely, counterposed 
spheres in the social sciences of meaning and materiality. Bourdieu's symbolic 
violence is also ironic: Conceived as "tacit agreement," it excludes a sense of 
coercion, unless coercion itself were understood ironically, or at least obliquely 
(1994:14).8 In this way, the usual semantic association between "violence" and 
adjectives like "gentle" and "imperceptible" is inverted. Corollarily, rather than 
an analogous concept to physical violence, symbolic violence is rendered its 
negative complement: The need for physical violence to maintain the established 
order arises from insufficient symbolic violence.9 If translated, albeit 
incongruously, into Gramscian terms, winning consent, as well as exercising 
coercion, would be considered violence—symbolic and physical, respectively. 
Thus, Bourdieu's concept overextends the notion of violence to encompass not 
only physical violence but the condition of its absence: Violence is made 
effectively synonymous with domination. More critically, his theory of symbolic 
violence misses a key aspect of domination, what I refer to as doxic asymmetry, 
the analysis of which has the potential to help explain the legitimate use of 
physical violence. 
Bourdieu's theoretical model of order and domination rests, I argue, on a 
problematic assumption. He posits the "unanimity of doxa," that is, the unanimity 
of what is taken for granted. Not meant as an ideal type or a limiting case, this 
unanimity is intended to be quite literal: "nothing is further from the correlative 
notion of the majority than the unanimity of doxa" (1977:168; emphases in 
original). Though stated in absolute terms here, there is some ambiguity in his 
other writings. For example, his illustration of women's doxic submission was 
based on surveys that found "a large majority of French women say they want a 
husband who is older and also (quite coherently) taller than themselves" 
(Bourdieu 2001:35; emphasis added). 
Whatever the ambiguities, I do not dispute that there is a large realm of the 
established order that goes unquestioned by the dominant and the dominated 
alike, for the study of which Bourdieu's social theory and research are 
invaluable.10 What I dispute is that there exist only two realms: the "universe of 
the undiscussed (undisputed)" and the "universe of discourse (or argument)" 
(Bourdieu 1977:168). In Figure 1, the solid, oval boundary represents this 
mutually exclusive division between the unconscious doxa on the one hand, in 
which symbolic violence takes place, and the consciously orthodox (i.e., 
dominant) and heterodox (i.e., dominated or subaltern) opinions on the other. 
Partitioned neatly into what is implicitly agreed and what is explicitly disagreed, 
this theoretical model leaves no room for disagreement over what is implicit. 
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Figure 1. Bourdieu's Diagram of Symbolic Order and Domination 
universe of the undiscussed 
j (undisputed) 
doxa 
hetero-
doxy 
symbolic vwlence universe of discourse 
(or argument) 
Source: Bourdieu (1977:168). Otherwise identical to the original, this figure 
includes the conceptual location of symbolic violence in accordance with 
Bourdieu's theory. 
In one sense, the foregoing omission is puzzling, for all of Bourdieu's 
analyses presuppose and demonstrate the ubiquity and durability of hierarchical 
social divisions, foremost class ones. However, these social divisions do not 
divide the "universe of doxa." Instead, Bourdieu assumes, as Thompson 
(1984:61; emphasis in original) notes, "a certain kind of consensus with regard 
to the values or norms which are dominant in the society concerned."11 As much 
as the dominant, the dominated find natural the order of things. 
It is hard to accept, even ideal-typically, that there is no disagreement over 
what is taken for granted, for example, between capitalists and workers, men 
and women, whites and people of color, natives and immigrants, teachers and 
students, and so on. I suggest that there is a certain asymmetry of doxa that 
accords with, if imperfectly, the asymmetry of relations of domination. The 
dominated are conscious, albeit variably and far from fully, of much of what 
remains unconscious for the dominant. This asymmetry is, for instance, precisely 
what feminist and antiracist research has consistently shown: Occupying 
unmarked, normative categories, men and whites in the United States remain 
oblivious to the breadth and depth of inequalities of gender and race, while 
women and people of color are forced to be much more aware of not only the 
inequalities but also the obliviousness to which they are subject.12 
Doxic asymmetry corresponds to Du Bois's concept of double 
consciousness, an undervalued and underutilized concept in mainstream social 
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theory. Intrinsic to the concept is an asymmetric slippage in what is and is not 
taken for granted, because those who are oppressed—to extrapolate from Du 
Bois's discussion of race and African Americans—are, due to their oppression, 
"gifted with second-sight," able, and indeed compelled, to see the world through 
the eyes of the dominant as well as through their own ([1903] 1965:214-215). 
Put in Bourdieu's idiom, the dominated recognize, if only partially, the cultural 
arbitrary of the relation of domination that the dominant misrecognize as natural. 
For example, doxic asymmetry may account for why the best past writings on 
race by people of color, like Du Bois's, tend to read less dated today than those 
written by their white counterparts, because they recognized contemporarily 
the cultural arbitrary of a racial formation that whites could recognize only 
retrospectively.13 
Although he does not allow for the "second-sight" of the dominated in his 
social theory, Bourdieu provides an apt example of it from his personal biography, 
characterized interestingly as an effect of "racism." Of his provincial social 
origin, Bourdieu states: 
It gives you a sort of objective and subjective externality and 
puts you in a particular relation to the central institutions of 
French society and therefore to the intellectual institution. 
There are subtle (and not so subtle) forms of social racism 
that cannot but make you perceptive; being constantly 
reminded of your otherness stimulates a sort of permanent 
sociological vigilance. It helps you perceive things that others 
cannot see or feel (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992:209). 
Du Bois ([1903] 1965:215) had long ago described a similar situation of "always 
looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the 
tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity." 
If we were to modify Bourdieu's theory by incorporating Du Bois's insight, 
there would be a third realm in the symbolic order in which subaltern 
consciousness, or heterodox discourses, is not consciously recognized, or even 
recognizable, by the dominant. I propose that symbolic violence should be 
rethought of as this tacit nonrecognition (see Figure 2). It shares with Bourdieu 
the idea that symbolic violence is a matter of course for the dominant, requiring 
no conscious formulation of intention, but differs in that the dominated 
consciously recognize and question aspects of the established order that the 
dominant take for granted. To be clear, I do not mean that the dominated are 
conscious of all, or even most, aspects of domination.14 But, symbolic violence 
occurs when some subaltern discourses are not recognized as such because deeply 
held dominant beliefs (i.e., doxa), and dominant discourses structured by them, 
preclude it. 
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Figure 2. Modified Diagram of Symbolic Order and Domination 
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The latter point concerning dominant discourses needs some clarification. 
According to Bourdieu (1977:169; emphasis in original), once provoked to 
discourse by the "competing possibles" posited and implied by subaltern 
discourses, the dominant attempt, "without ever entirely succeeding," to "restorfe] 
the primal state of innocence of doxa" through orthodoxy, "straight, or rather 
straightened, opinion." Though mostly in agreement, I suggest that doxa can 
sometimes remain unfazed even when awakened into discourse. Some dominant 
discourses, even if they refer to subaltern discourses, may not be consciously 
straightened opinions. Rather, they may be doxa sleeptalking, as it were. There 
is no conscious engagement or "argument," in Bourdieu's sense, because the 
dominant do not hear that there is anything to be argued, even as they argue. In 
other words, the restoration of the "innocence of doxa" may not always be 
necessary, because the dominant may not recognize that it is threatened. They 
remain oblivious.15 
Whereas symbolic violence, for Bourdieu, designates the unconscious 
agreement of the dominated, my proposed reconceptualization, recovering an 
unironic sense of coercion, denotes the conscious disagreement of the dominated 
that goes unconsciously unrecognized by the dominant. Most relevant for this 
study, this reconceptualization provides leverage in understanding the legitimate 
use of physical violence: The effect of symbolic violence is to render its victims— 
whose discourses are so illegitimate as to be below conscious recognition and 
engagement by the dominant—susceptible to various forms of discrimination, 
including physical violence. 
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This reformulation of symbolic violence accords with what we mean, in 
ordinary speech, when we speak of the "voiceless" or the "vulnerable." By 
"voiceless," we mean that certain opinions contrary to the established order are 
unrecognized, not that those opinions do not or even cannot exist, save for during 
exceptional moments of "crisis."16 For example, it is not that poor Black 
communities are unaware of or do not speak against—in other words, are tacitly 
complicitous with—the police abuse they face on a daily basis that makes them 
vulnerable to it. Rather, it is the tacit nonrecognition of the Black poor's discourse 
of police abuse by whites and the state, structured by doxic beliefs to the contrary, 
that makes police abuse legitimate police practice (Cullen et al. 1996; Dudley 
1991; Marable 2000; Nelson 2000; Ogletree et al. 1995; Vargas 2003). In 
contrast, conscious recognition and engagement of subaltern discourses by the 
dominant, however antithetical the engagement may be, would more likely bring 
under scrutiny the legitimacy of any conservative acts of physical violence.17 
Here, note once legitimate forms of physical violence that no longer command 
widespread legitimacy (e.g., lynching, genocide). 
As for Bourdieu's symmetric assertion that the state successfully claims a 
monopoly of the legitimate use of both symbolic violence and physical violence, 
the empirical case below, and many others, shows that the state, though uniquely 
powerful, holds no such exclusive claim over the former.18 In fact, Bourdieu's 
(1984, 2001) analyses of cultural consumption and gender domination, among 
others—in which symbolic violence is prevalent, but the state, though not absent, 
does not assume centrality—illustrate this point.19 The link between symbolic 
violence and the legitimate use of physical violence is not the monopolization 
of both by the state. Instead, a singular power of the state may be its routine 
capability to articulate symbolic violence, much of which occurs beyond the 
state, to physical violence, of which the state does claim, if not necessarily 
successfully, a monopoly. 
Hanapçpç Massacre: Symbolic and Physical Violence 
With certain exceptions, like the much discussed death of Captain James 
Cook in 1779 (e.g., Obeyesekere 1992; Sahlins 1985, 1995), violence has not 
been a major focus of historical research on Hawaii. The paucity of research 
can be attributed largely to the long-standing assumption, both without and within 
the academe, of Hawaii's exceptionalism: that Hawaii, the so-called "Paradise 
of the Pacific," has enjoyed social equanimity unimaginable on the "mainland."20 
With this paper, I suggest that this assumption is untenable. Implicating an 
economic and political core of prewar Hawaii, its quintessential sugar industry, 
the Hanapçpç Massacre, I seek to establish, is not an inexplicable anomaly, as 
commonly thought.21 
The most fundamental empirical questions for this paper are: How was the 
massacre of Filipino strikers possible, and how did it not raise public expressions 
of doubts of legitimacy? In line with the reconceptualization of symbolic violence 
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outlined above, I propose that Filipino men in Hawai'i had been subject to a 
particular racial, and gendered, form of symbolic violence that made possible 
and legitimate the lethal use of physical violence against them. 
Although dating back to the early nineteenth century, Hawaii's sugar industry 
remained relatively undeveloped until the Reciprocity Treaty of 1876. The treaty 
between the Kingdom of Hawaii (and, from 1894 to 1898, the Republic of 
Hawaii) and the United States permitted the duty-free entry of unrefined sugar 
from Hawai'i into the U.S. market; the Republic of Hawaii was established by 
an elite group, led by Americans, in a forcible overthrow of the Hawaiian 
monarchy. The U.S. annexation of Hawai'i in 1898 as an "incorporated territory" 
continued the tariff protection.22 
The access to the protected U.S. market led to a tremendous growth of the 
sugar industry.23 It also touched off an intense concentration of capital, as the 
large investments needed to finance the growth drove out small, independent 
producers. Consequently, a handful of agencies or factors, commonly referred 
to as the "Big Five," came to dominate the industry.24 Moreover, the Big Five 
were, in turn, controlled and owned by a small number of haole families with 
lineages to the Christian missionaries of the nineteenth century.25 The 
concentration of capital, as well as interlocking directorates among the Big Five 
and intermarriages among the "missionary" families, impelled industrial cohesion 
and the formation of the HSPA (Dean 1950; MacLennan 1979). 
Leveraging their commanding position in sugar, the Big Five assumed a 
similar dominance in the maritime industry. Later, the Big Five also made 
considerable inroads in the pineapple industry, obtaining a majority market share 
of what would fast become Hawaii's second largest industry by the early 1930s 
(Brooks 1952). Nonetheless, the sugar industry remained the backbone of the 
Big Five and Hawaii's economy, accounting for about $75 million of the 
territory's $109 million in exports in 1924.26 
Until the New Deal, the Big Five's stranglehold on Hawaii's economy was 
cozily tied to an amenable territorial government. It intervened consistently on 
behalf of powerful employers and against workers, most of whom were either 
disenfranchised or, in cases of the Portuguese and the nisei, pressured by haole 
into Republican consent (USBLS 1940; USHR 1940).27 
With the rapid development of the sugar industry, labor supply was a constant 
concern for employers. From the mid-nineteenth century, Hawaiians and 
migrants—actively recruited in overlapping succession, primarily from China, 
Portugal, Japan, and the Philippines—labored on sugar plantations. Following 
their initial contractual stints in sugar, they drifted off, in varying degrees, and 
worked in other industries. When the Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907-08 
between the United States and Japan halted the migration of Japanese laborers, 
the Philippines became the planters' only major source of additional labor. From 
1912 onward, Japanese and Filipino workers were the most numerous in the 
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sugar industry, with the latter becoming the largest by 1922. In 1920, there were 
19,474 Japanese and 13,061 Filipino workers, combining for 73.4 percent of 
the sugar labor force. In 1924, the respective numbers were 12,781 and 19,475, 
accounting for 81.5 percent (Hawaiian Annual 1913:35; 1921:17; 1923:14; 
1925:12).28 
The 1924 strike of Filipino sugar workers had its origin in a strike four 
years earlier. The five-month strike in 1920 involved around 8,300 Japanese 
and Filipino workers on O'ahu, representing 77 percent of the island's work 
force. It was conducted by O'ahu members of two separate unions, the Federation 
of Japanese Labor and the Filipino Labor Union (FLU), with members on the 
outer islands continuing to work and contributing their wages to the strikers. 
The unions struck for higher wages, eight-hour workdays, overtime pay, maternity 
leave, and better health and recreational facilities (Reinecke 1979:95). The strike 
ended in defeat with the planters making "no concessions whatsoever, either 
direct or implied."29 
At the center of the strikers' concerns in 1920 was the plantations' bonus 
system. Receiving much of their wages through bonuses that were pegged to the 
price of sugar, workers anticipated a drop in the World War I-inflated price and 
demanded a higher basic wage and a restructured bonus system. As feared and 
predicted, the wholesale price of sugar fell precipitously, from a record high of 
12.33 cents per pound in 1920 to 4.63 cents per pound in 1922 (Taylor 1935:168). 
The turnout bonus was consequently worth only about a penny an hour (Beechert 
1985:217). The daily wage of an unskilled laborer was, for all intents and 
purposes, the industry's minimum wage of one dollar, the sugar industry's 
repeated protestations about the "average" wage being much higher 
notwithstanding. And, if all workers fell ill to the proverbial flu of the sugar 
price drop, Filipino workers caught pneumonia, being largely confined to 
minimum-wage unskilled jobs. 
In the fall of 1922 and again in 1923, Filipino workers, many of whom 
were veterans of the FLU, held a series of meetings on various plantations.30 In 
the meetings—led by Pablo Manlapit, a former sugar and dock worker turned 
lawyer and labor leader who had led the FLU in the 1920 strike, and George 
Wright, the haole head of an AFL local who had led a short-lived drive for an 
interracial labor movement—the workers drafted a petition with a list of their 
"requests," for which over 6,000 signatures were collected (Manlapit 1933:34).31 
As indicated by the name they adopted for the union and the movement, the 
High Wages Movement (HWM), the primary requests or demands of the workers 
were the raising of the minimum wage to two dollars and the elimination of the 
bonus system. The other demands were reduction of the workday to eight hours, 
time and half for overtime and double time for work on Sundays and legal 
holidays, "equal compensation for men and women engaged in the same kind of 
work," "proportionate increase in the wages paid to skilled and semi-skilled 
employees," and "recognition of the principle of collective bargaining and the 
rights of employees to organize for their mutual benefit and protection."32 
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The petition, along with a letter, was sent to the HSPA on 10 April 1923. 
Holding to its past practice of dealing with labor unions, the HSPA ignored the 
petition. The HWM sent another letter and a second copy of the petition in early 
November 1923, which the HSPA again ignored. A third attempt was made on 
20 December 1923 with the same result.33 Reasoning that the HSPA was legally 
not an incorporated body but a "purely voluntary clique" with no legal standing, 
the HWM then made a last ditch effort at presenting the petition to the "individual 
plantation companies, which [were] incorporated and legally responsible."34 
Predictably, neither the HSPA nor the individual member plantations responded 
to the petitions (Manlapit 1933:61). 
As outlined in the HWM manifesto of January 1924, the HSPA's refusals 
led the union to proceed with its intention to strike. In March 1924, the Executive 
Committee of the HWM drafted a "Strike Proclamation," calling for the strike 
to commence on 1 April 1924. The proclamation stated that workers on some 
plantations would engage in a "direct strike," while those on the other plantations 
would "go on a silent strike," essentially a slowdown.35 Whether non-striking 
Filipino workers actually went on a "silent strike" is unclear, but the "direct 
strike" did begin its erratic career on the island of O'ahu on 1 April, though with 
minimal organizational structure, strike fund, or means of communication 
(Beechert 1985:219). It then meandered haltingly through the island of Hawai'i, 
beginning in June, and the islands of Maui and Kaua'i, beginning in July 
(Manlapit 1933:65; Reinecke 1996:32-34). Illustrative of the indeterminate 
character of the strike, it ended sometime in 1925, but an exact date cannot be 
placed, although it effectively ended with the Hanapçpç Massacre. In the course 
of the strike, it directly involved 34 of the islands' 49 plantations and up to 
three-fifths of the Filipino work force (Reinecke 1996:30-33). 
The HWM's general lack of organization, like that of its predecessor FLU, 
was not surprising, given Filipino workers' limited institutional support and 
itinerancy. The latest to be recruited, Filipino sugar workers were almost 
exclusively young men without families (Lind 1980:41-43; Nordyke 1977: table 
4b.7). Severely circumscribed in their opportunities, due not only to their late 
arrival but also unremitting discrimination, Filipinos were and would remain 
overwhelmingly tied to the plantation economy as unskilled labor (Jung 1999). 
In 1928, over two decades after their first arrival, more than three-fourths (76.5%) 
of all Filipinos in Hawai'i lived on sugar plantations; in contrast, among the 
Japanese, less than one-third (30.0%) remained sugar plantation residents.36 Also 
far outpacing all others, over 90 percent of gainfully employed Filipino men 
were classified as "laborers" in the 1930 census (Lind 1980:84-85). 
Socially isolated in plantation communities, Filipinos worked in the worst 
jobs and lived in the worst housing. With few resources to spare, they were 
unable to establish much in the way of durable institutions: "Unlike the plantation 
Japanese with their temples, language schools, young men's associations, and 
neighborhood stores, the Filipinos had no community roots." Filipinos also had 
no established press of their own, and the mainstream newspapers provided no 
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viable alternative, as rare references in them to Filipinos were limited to reports 
of arrests and industrial accidents. Adding to the lack of community stability 
was the high turnover rate among Filipinos, who moved from one plantation to 
another in search of higher wages. In 1923, the rate of turnover for Filipino 
workers was 80 percent (Reinecke 1996:2-3). 
As much as the strike's lack of organization proved to be a liability, its 
improvisational, tortuous tour of the islands proved to be an unpredicted asset 
as well. The sugar industry never knew when, where, or for how long the workers 
were going to strike. Nevertheless, the sugar industry coalesced in the face of 
the amorphous strike and did not hesitate to apply all due force. As in the past, 
compromise was not entertained. Ten days prior to the strike, the HSPA set up a 
strike claims committee to deal with strike losses, diffusing the costs to the 
entire industry. The struck plantations evicted the strikers, forcibly if necessary 
(Beechert 1985:220). Acts of espionage and frame-ups against labor leaders 
through informants and agents provocateur were also standard practice by 1924 
(Manlapit 1933:66-67; Reinecke 1996:40, 43). Conducted at a time of labor 
scarcity, the industry's main source of strikebreakers was newly arriving Filipino 
workers, a thousand of whom, according to Manlapit (1933:67-68), joined the 
strike. As usual for prewar strikes, it ended with the workers obtaining none of 
their material demands. 
Although a few historical accounts have well described the Hanapçpç 
Massacre over the years, most comprehensively by John E. Reinecke (1996: ch. 
10), they have not put forth a theoretical explanation for its possibility and for 
the prevailing unconcern for the dead and wounded Filipinos and the large number 
of Filipinos promptly accused and convicted of causing the conflict. I argue that 
deeply held, doxic beliefs of the haole elite and the larger public about Filipino 
men, specifically their imputed natural predisposition toward violence, precluded 
the recognition of contrary Filipino discourses and practices. This symbolic 
violence—tacit nonrecognition of Filipino workers' discourse and practice of 
nonviolence—rendered them vulnerable to physical violence, the legitimacy of 
which would not be questioned. 
In Hawai'i, each migrant group of workers faced a qualitatively distinctive 
racism. As in the U.S. colony of the Philippines, Filipinos in Hawai'i were 
constructed as an inferior, primitive race (Jung 1999).37 In this regard, 
Temperament and Race, a study by psychologists Stanley Porteus and Marjorie 
Babcock at the University of Hawaii, unintentionally offered an unguarded look 
at the racial gaze of Hawaii's haole elite of the 1920s. As a part of the study, the 
authors obtained "social ratings" of Hawaii's racial groups from "twenty-five 
people of long experience in the islands," most of whom turned out to be 
plantation managers (Porteus and Babcock 1926:90).38 Of the eight "traits" 
rated—"planning capacity," "self determination," "inhibition of impulse," 
"resolution," "self control," "stability of interest," "tact," and "dependability"— 
Filipinos ranked either last or second to last on seven of them, "tact" being the 
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sole exception. In other words, Filipinos were considered to be extremely short-
sighted, suggestible, impulsive, irresolute, overemotional, unstable in their 
interests, and undependable, although of average tactfulness (Porteus and 
Babcock 1926:92-97). A survey study of Hawaii's Japanese later showed similar 
antipathy toward Filipinos—similar both in intensity and in kind (Masuoka 1931). 
Suggesting a general pattern for Hawai'i, the Chinese also held Filipinos in the 
lowest regard (Masuoka 1931).39 
In line with their imputed "primitive temperament" and lack of manly 
discipline, Filipinos were regarded as a violent race, as the study by Porteus and 
Babcock (1926:64-68) found: 
They are rather highly emotional, impulsive and almost 
explosive in temperament. With this type, attempts to muzzle 
expression are rather dangerous so that it is always better to 
give the Filipino plenty of opportunities to talk himself out.. . . 
The explosive extrovert temperament is also reflected by 
the crime statistics. . . . By analyzing the statistics of court 
convictions for the last ten years it was found that more than 
half the murders, 43 per cent of the sex offenses, 36 per cent 
of the gambling and 28 per cent of the burglaries were 
committed by Filipinos. . . . 
Under the stress of violent anger or a sense of grave 
injustice he shows no tendency to reflect, so that the act of 
revenge often is altogether out of proportion to the offense 
and sometimes in cases of "running amuck" the punishment 
falls on the innocent as well as the guilty. . . . 
The Filipinos in common with other extrovert peoples 
are rather over-emotional but the currents of feeling do not 
run very deep. Their outbursts are indicative of weak inhibition 
rather than of strong emotions. . . . 
Summing up these characteristics we may say that the 
Filipinos represent a fine example of a race in an adolescent 
stage of development.40 
Again, this view of Filipinos extended beyond the haole community. A 
contemporary observer as well as historian of interwar Hawai'i, Reinecke 
(1996:3) writes, "Between the Filipinos and other ethnic groups there was a 
wide social distance. . . . A great part of the population stereotyped them as 
hotheaded, knife-wielding, overdressed, sex-hungry young men." Filipino 
workers themselves recalled that the terms "poke poke" and "poke knife" were 
slurs commonly directed at them by others, not only haole, for their putative 
propensity to engage in violence.41 
In Bourdieu's terms, claims of Filipinos' violent nature and racial inferiority 
were dominant beliefs, not empirically controvertible propositions open to 
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argument. For example, of the nisei subjects in her study, who overwhelmingly 
had negative views of Filipinos, Masuoka (1931:162) wrote, "Evidently some 
of the second generation Japanese are so conditioned that mere perception [sight] 
of a Filipino man calls forth [a] conditioned response." One of the presumably 
typical respondents quoted in Masuoka's study, a nisei woman recalled an early 
childhood incident—her "first experience with the Filipinos" and "a very frightful 
one"—to explain her racial enmity: 
While picking [guavas] I saw three Filipinos approaching us. 
I thought I saw them carrying knives, so I told my friends 
about it. We threw our guavas away and started to run toward 
my parents. One of my friends was so frightened that she yelled 
for help. 
Whenever, I pass this place now I always smile, because 
I know that the Filipinos did not carry knives with them but it 
was only an illusion. Since we were told so often that the 
Filipinos carried knives with them and carried away girls that 
app[a]rently those three innocent Filipinos appeared to us 
dreadful people on earth. 
I am very much afraid of the Filipinos. It is because of 
my early experience with some of the Filipino men. 
After telling another similar story, she concluded, "Even now I do not feel at 
ease in the presence of the Filipinos" (Masuoka 1931:162-163). In other words, 
the stories—although she recognized them as empirically unfounded and as 
conditioned by having been "told so often" about Filipinos—served to confirm 
her belief about Filipino men's violent predisposition, especially toward "girls."42 
The assumption of inevitable violence suffused the 1924 strike: "Everyone," 
according to Reinecke (1996:35), "expected a Filipino strike to be a violent 
one." Not confined to the haole elite, a Japanese newspaper that supported the 
Filipino workers editorialized, "If the strike is once commenced, violent deeds 
would be perpetrated everywhere. We may witness nearly every day the arson 
and murder" {Hawaii Shinpo 8 March 1924, as quoted in Reinecke 1996:36).43 
Even Wright, who would be fired from his job at the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard in 
1925 for his part in the strike, unintentionally betrayed a similar belief in his 
reaction to the dismissal: 
I accepted the responsibility [of advising the High Wages 
Movement] because I believed my influence among the 
Filipinos would be effective in restraining them and directing 
them along recognized legitimate lines, avoiding all violent 
and destructive tactics Anyone who has followed my work 
from the beginning must agree that I have been frank and 
sincere, exerting a conservative influence and teaching these 
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primitive people the American principles and ideals (as quoted 
inReinecke 1996:158). 
Recounting the strike much later, a working-class resident on Kaua'i stated, 
"[At] that time, Filipinos, they go for broke, they no scared. Not like now; kind 
of civilized."44 
Contrary to Bourdieu's notion of the "unanimity of doxa," however, Filipino 
workers themselves consciously recognized and resisted the dominant beliefs 
of their predisposition toward violence and, more generally, of their inferiority.45 
Aware of such widespread fears, Filipino workers explicitly and repeatedly called 
for nonviolence. For example, their "Strike Proclamation" declared typically, 
"Let us stand together, avoid violence, use every lawful means to gain our ends, 
and we will WIN THE FIGHT."46 In an addendum titled "WARNING," it went 
on to state, 
The Executive Committee of the High Wages Movement 
hereby warns all strikers against committing acts of violence 
and breaking the laws. The planters have their laws against 
vagrancy, picketing, they use some wrong and put you in jail, 
or frame up cases against your leaders. . . . Strikers who 
deliberately violate the law must expect punishment and need 
not look to this committee for defense or protection Watch 
out for traps set for you by stool pigeons and traitors. In every 
strike there are always some of the skunks who mix with the 
strikers and try to stir up trouble. When you catch any of these 
fellows, don't be rough or cruel to them, that would be against 
the law. Be orderly, cheerful, quiet and patient. You are fighting 
for justice and a square deal, and for American ideals. Get the 
sympathy of the public by your good behavior.47 
The wife of one of the strikers in Hanapçpç vividly recalled hearing Manlapit 
emphasize nonviolence in a speech she had heard.48 Another remembered the 
discourse of the workers in similar terms: "That was really the understanding, 
that the strike would be won and would be pursued by the strikers not through a 
troublesome kind of way, but it would be done through a peaceful way. They 
really didn't want to use arms."49 This discourse of nonviolence also circulated 
through the union newspaper, Aug Batay (Beechert 1985:219). 
Up until the Hanapçpç Massacre, the strike was indeed remarkably free of 
violence.50 A striker in Kâpa'a, on Kaua'i, remembered, "So, we continued living 
down there on the beach [in the strike camp], and we lived in a very peaceable 
kind of way. We didn't make any trouble and we didn't want any trouble."51 
Similarly, Hilo experienced no rise in crime as it took in a huge influx of strikers 
from the Big Island's plantations; the island was where the strike grew to be the 
largest. Even the decidedly antistrike newspapers, Hilo Tribune-Herald (28 June 
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1924) and Honolulu Advertiser {15 August 1924), made notes of the unexpected 
calm in Hilo (Reinecke 1996:52, 56). Admitting grudgingly that, before the 
massacre, the strikers "never made trouble," those who regarded Filipinos as 
uncivilized and violent reconciled their beliefs with this inconvenient fact by 
suspecting that the Filipinos "were scheming what to do."52 
Exemplifying what I refer to as symbolic violence, the dominant haole elite 
could not go against, or even question, their belief of Filipinos' violent nature to 
recognize or engage the workers' discourse and practice of nonviolence. Instead, 
the sugar industry and the territorial government prepared, quite literally, for 
battle, as the former funded the latter to hire "special police" and as both 
stockpiled weapons. A week after the HWM's "Strike Proclamation" and ten 
days before the start of the strike, the HSPA, as a part of its establishing a strike 
claims committee, set up funds for "hiring special policemen." With these funds, 
the HSPA paid the government to hire more police for the express purpose of 
quelling the strike, all but erasing the line between corporate interests and the 
state.53 On O'ahu, over a hundred special police officers were hired. On Kaua'i, 
110 would be paid off at the end of 1924. On the Big Island, the number on 
active duty reached over 300. At its peak in Lâhainâ, Maui, 107 police officers 
patrolled 600 strikers; at one particularly absurd point, 95 kept watch over 230 
strikers (Reinecke 1996:36). 
Two uneventful weeks into the strike on O'ahu, the HSPA sent out a directive 
to the plantations on the outer islands, ordering that "arms, ammunition, belts, 
badges, etc. which are able to be recovered and salvaged will be brought out to 
Honolulu, put in condition for use and ready for immediate distribution, if 
necessity should arise."54 Two days before the directive, the HSPA assessed 
each plantation 40 cents for each ton of the average produced for the years 
1921 -23 to pay the premiums for insurance against arson and violence (Beechert 
1985:220). In June, an HSPA bulletin instructed plantation managers, "If there 
are any violent speeches made, or any threats, or actions violative of the anti-
picketing statute, it is hoped that the plantation managers will be able to cause 
the civil authorities to arrest Manlapit at once and prosecute him or any of his 
gang." Unfazed by evidence contrary to his belief, J. K. Butler, HSPA's secretary, 
lamented, "It is unfortunately true that despite our surveillance we have not 
been able to get a good case against him. This would be highly desirable because 
there is no question of his many violations of law."55 Targeting the leadership 
may have been especially urgent, since Butler deemed the "majority of the 
Filipinos [to] have the mentality of 13-year-old children."56 
A self-fulfilling prophecy, the arms build-up in anticipation of violence set 
the stage for its realization. On 9 September 1924, Kaua'i county's deputy sheriff 
and 40 police officers, most of whom were special police, went to Hanapçpç to 
retrieve two Ilocano men, "perhaps waverers on the question of striking," who 
had been detained forcibly by a group of Visayan strikers the day before 
(Reinecke 1996:75).57 As the police took custody of the two men and were taking 
them away, the deadly violence broke out. After the armed conflict, the police 
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arrested well over a hundred, rounding up all surviving Filipino men in Hanapçpç. 
Filipino labor leaders from the other side of Kaua'i, who had no connection to 
the violent conflict, were also arrested. Over 90 National Guards were dispatched 
to Kaua'i the next day. Kauai's sheriff "form[ed] a company of 30 sharpshooters 
from among his 200 special deputies, who drilled under the direction of the 
Guardsmen" (Reinecke 1976:83). 
There was little uncertainty in the dominant discourse concerning the culprit: 
The Filipino strikers were to blame. According to a police captain at the scene, 
The Filipinos were right up against us when they started firing. 
They had flourished guns and brandished knives. . . . When 
they began firing we returned the fire, but they kept coming 
until as one after another fell they scattered and fled into a 
banana grove beside the road. From their shelter in the grove 
the rioters continued to snipe at us with a scattering fire for a 
quarter of an hour (Honolulu Advertiser 12 September 1924, 
as quoted in Reinecke 1996:77).58 
The National Guard's report to the governor closely followed the police account: 
"The strikers kept pressing closer and closer on the officers as they neared their 
cars, when finally a shot was fired at the police by the strikers which was returned 
by the police."59 An assistant manager of a nearby plantation echoed these 
accounts as an eyewitness (Reinecke 1996:77). The mainstream newspapers— 
Kauai's Garden Island, Honolulu Advertiser, and Honolulu Star-Bulletin— 
likewise placed all of the blame on the strikers, taking their cue and quotes from 
the police involved (Chapin 1996; Taniguchi et al. 1979).60 The Star-Bulletin 
(10 and 11 September 1924) referred to it as "mob-murder" and "strike murders," 
condemning not only the strikers in Hanapçpç but also the "criminal labor 
agitators and all their ilk" (quoted in Reinecke 1996:81). The Advertiser (12 
September 1924) stated that the "riot was premeditated" (quoted in Kerkvliet 
2002:52). Predictably, the HSPA's position was that the "Kauai tragedy [was 
the] result of strikers' efforts to terrorize": 
[T]he Filipino strikers fired, killing one police officer and 
generally attacking the police with firearms, knives, clubs and 
other weapons, killing four officers and wounding several 
others, including the Deputy Sheriff, who suffered knife 
wounds. 
Not until attacked murderously did the police use force.61 
The president of the HSPA also cited the prevalence of guns among the strikers: 
"It seems very unfortunate that such a large number of these people have firearms 
in their possession, many of which were obtained through mail order houses on 
the mainland."62 Likewise, among the general public, the police came under 
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criticism not for their deadly use of force but for not having taken away the 
Filipino strikers' firearms beforehand; not to be dissuaded by lack of evidence, 
when a subsequent search of the strike camp in Kâpa'a by the police and the 
National Guard, armed with a machine gun and fixed bayonets, turned up only 
two pistols, the explanation became that the strikers had already thrown then-
weapons into the ocean.63 Asked much later if the bloodshed at Hanapçpç could 
have been avoided, one Kaua'i couple responded, "Nan, at that time, Filipinos 
was just like cannibal, eh. . . . Filipinos, ho shit; they think kill[ing] people 
nothing."64 
As before the killings, Filipino strikers' contrary discourse continued to be 
ignored as a matter of course, not as a conscious strategy to silence. For example, 
that the Filipino strikers were not wholly responsible for the violent outbreak 
did not seem to be within the realm of possibilities in the dominant accounts, 
requiring no mention, even to dismiss. The killing of the sixteen strikers by the 
police failed to elicit scrutiny, much less reproof, in the dominant discourse. 
Accordingly, the families of the dead police officers received prompt 
compensation from the HSPA, while the dead Filipinos were buried together in 
a mass grave.65 
Though not recognized at the time, the Filipino strikers' interpretation of 
events did indeed differ markedly from the dominant discourse and the doxic 
beliefs about Filipinos that shaped it. No firsthand accounts were taken from 
the strikers' point of view (Reinecke 1996), but some would eventually get to 
tell their stories, if only long after the fact (ESOHP1979).66 To begin with, there 
was a general mistrust of the police. According to a striker on Kaua'i, 
And we were hoping that the police could see that our intention 
was not to hurt anybody or to cause any kind of trouble. You 
know, but as a matter of fact, the kind of police that they had 
during that time, they were the first ones to make some kind 
of trouble. The police themselves were against the strikers. 
And you know, that's really at base, what happened there at 
Hanapepe. That's why a lot of people died.67 
More specifically, the strikers disputed the dominant assumptions that they had 
possessed many guns, that they had taken the first shot, and that the killing of 
strikers by the police had been only in self-defense. These contentions turned 
out to confirm the one atypical newspaper account that had come "the closest to 
giving the strikers' version": a paper with a fleeting existence of less than a half-
year, Honolulu Times reported the first shot being fired by the special police, 
only two Filipinos having pistols and only one firing, and eleven Filipinos being 
shot from behind (Reinecke 1996:167). 
According to the strikers at the Hanapçpç strike camp, they had very few 
guns and perhaps even fewer bullets.68 A then newcomer to Kaua'i from the 
Philippines, who did not strike, corroborated the strikers, "And you could hear 
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the shooting all at once. And the strikers only had a weapon or two, if any, and 
almost no bullets. And so, that much shooting, it would have to come from the 
police. Pieces of wood don't shoot bullets."69 On the question of who proximately 
touched off the violence, one recalled that "everybody was saying among the 
strikers, I t was the police who started it.'"70 Others were less sure: "I really 
don't know who started it."71 In either case, Filipino workers had not internalized 
the dominant belief of their violent nature to presume that the strikers had been 
the instigators. As to the accepted narrative that the police had reacted only in 
self-defense, the strikers were clear in their disagreement. According to them, 
right after the initial outburst, the strikers ran away from the gun fire: "Really 
wrong, because if he [strikers] run like that, he protecting body, he no like die, 
that's why he run. But what? He [police] shoot."72 The police, some of them 
positioned on a bank, continued to fire their rifles: "They just kept shooting and 
shooting and of course, a lot of strikers died.. . . The police were up there on a 
small hill and they had the advantage. They were just picking off the strikers."73 
In line with the strikers' account, a Filipino minister who saw the dead Filipino 
bodies remembered that most had been shot in the back.74 
With regard to the dominant, but not the dominated, I agree with Bourdieu 
(1977:168) that they can recognize what they took for granted and misrecognized 
as natural "only retrospectively, when they come to be suspended practically." 
Indeed, this idea is borne out in the case of the Hanapçpç Massacre, evincing 
further that the dominant's nonrecognition of the Filipinos' discourse in 1924 
had been tacit. Over a half-century after the massacre, during which Hawai'i 
underwent vast transformations, some of the dominant voices of the 1920s, from 
plantation management and mainstream press, came to hold opinions quite 
contrary to the then dominant discourse. According to the manager of an unstruck 
Kaua'i sugar plantation in 1924, who arrived at the scene of the violence in 
Hanapçpç shortly after it had begun, "Nobody knows who fired the [first] shot." 
He remembered, "[B]y the time I got there, the strikers weren't shooting back. 
They were just the police themselves." "Last[ing] half an hour or so," up to a 
dozen police officers shot at "anybody that was running from behind the bushes 
there, they 'd take a potshot It wasn't a real battle, it was a slaughter, really."75 
Similarly, the then reporter of the Garden Island, who had witnessed and covered 
the massacre, recalled, "When they began dropping, everybody began taking 
off. And some of the goat hunters [police] were still taking potshots at 'em as 
they ran This is my opinion—I think a lot of unnecessary shooting happened 
after it was over, on those that were running."76 Neither the Garden Island nor 
the Honolulu dailies carried such stories in 1924. It would be easy but mistaken 
to conclude that this journalist, and others, had consciously misrepresented the 
event in 1924; he gave no indication for such a conclusion. Rather, the 
unthinkable, doxa, became thinkable: "It's odd. I can look back on it, I wasn't 
shocked or anything [at the time]. It was just one of those things."77 
The legal proceedings reproduced the symbolic violence against Filipino 
strikers, once again legitimating the massacre. As the Garden Island reporter 
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characterized the process much later, "It was an open-and-shut case, of course."78 
In other words, there was no other outcome that was possible or thinkable: it 
was a matter "of course." The arrested were kept in jail without being charged. 
Though not unusual for the time, they were also not provided with lawyers or 
interpreters.79 Fifty-seven of the indicted pled guilty to assault and battery. The 
only evidence against them, in most cases, was their presence in the strike camp 
in Hanapçpç—"hence," Reinecke (1996:84) wryly notes, "their moral complicity 
in the riot." In fact, according to an arrested striker, the procedure for processing 
all of the arrested Filipino men was that they were paraded, one by one, in front 
of police officers who determined whether "they were there at the strike camp 
or not."80 
A grand jury indicted seventy-six others on charges of rioting.81 At the 
insistence of an arrested leader, one public defense attorney was then appointed 
to represent all of the accused. In contrast, directed by the territorial governor, 
Hawaii's attorney general appointed special deputy prosecutors in consultation 
with the HSPA, which also paid for them (Reinecke 1996). The dominant 
discourse in the courts and the public was that the violent "rioters" had been led 
astray by their own leaders and, evoking the dominant discourse during the 
1920 strike, possibly even the Japanese (Kerkvliet 2002:52).82 Unfortunately, 
"[c]ourt records and documents which may have provided insights from the 
perspective of the strikers have been routinely destroyed along with other records 
of the same era" (Taniguchi et al. 1979:x-xi).83 
In the end, 58 received four years in prison, while two received four years 
and eleven months; sixteen were acquitted. Many of the convicted, likely those 
identified as the leaders in Hanapçpç, were later deported to the Philippines.84 
At the sentence hearing, the presiding judge William C. Achi scolded the 
convicted strikers: 
Your principal trouble lies and your greatest danger is in the 
radicalism of some of your most prominent leaders. You must 
not be misled by any queer notion that in order to be successful 
in your strike you must take law into your own hands and 
commit acts of violence (quoted in Reinecke 1996:86). 
As the strike's principal historian Reinecke (1996:85) observes, the judge's 
statement "enunciated clearly the prevalent view of the strike, which included 
throwing the blame for Hanapepe upon the top union leaders, whose public 
utterances (and their private ones, too, so far as is known) had been consistently 
against violence." The incarceration and deportation of convicted Filipinos added 
but another layer of physical violence that was made legitimate by the symbolic 
violence to which they were subject. 
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Conclusion 
Since the world is not in a state of perpetual revolution, much of the social 
order, though pervaded by myriad inequalities, goes unquestioned, not only by 
the dominant but also by the dominated—"or else the world is a madhouse" 
(Sahlins 1985:153). More than any others', Bourdieu's social theory and research 
forcefully and convincingly argue this point. Scaling back the importance and 
purview of consciousness and discourse, he emphasizes the role of symbolic 
violence—tacit consent, or doxic submission, of the dominated—in reproducing 
and legitimating relations of domination. 
Bourdieu's conceptualization of symbolic violence, however, has several 
drawbacks. Conceived as tacit consent, it overly distends the notion of violence 
toward irony or obliquity. Consequently, the theoretical relationship between 
symbolic violence and physical violence is not analogous but negatively 
complementary: The use of physical violence—naked brute force—to conserve 
the established order proceeds from and indicates insufficient symbolic violence. 
Bourdieu is also unclear on how the state successfully claims the monopoly of 
the legitimate use of symbolic violence. Above all, his assumption of the 
"unanimity of doxa" exaggerates the consensus with regard to what "goes without 
saying because it comes without saying" (Bourdieu 1977:167-168). 
Patricia Hill Collins (1991:8) writes, "On some level, people who are 
oppressed usually know it." For Bourdieu, the level of this knowledge is limited 
to the universe of discourse, the restricted realm of consciously conflicting 
opinions between the dominant and the dominated that is mutually exclusive of 
the realm of unconscious unanimity, the universe of doxa. Du Bois's concept of 
double consciousness, I argue, contributes a valuable critique, inserting a third 
realm that contravenes the assumption of doxic unanimity. One effect of 
domination on the dominated is to be "gifted with second-sight" (Du Bois [ 1903] 
1965:214): Forced to see the world from the viewpoint of the dominant as well 
as from their own, the dominated are conscious of much of what remains 
unconscious for the dominant. Put simply, the dominated take less of the 
established order for granted than the dominant. Inversely, the dominant take 
more of it for granted. In other words, relations of domination entail asymmetry, 
not unanimity, of doxa. 
The asymmetry of doxa implies that some subaltern discourses are 
disregarded by the dominant as a matter of course. I propose that this tacit 
nonrecognition—not tacit consent—constitutes symbolic violence: It is the 
explicit disagreement of the dominated that is implicitly ignored by the dominant. 
The dominant are ignorant in a deep and true sense. Most relevant for this paper, 
the proposed reconceptualization helps to explain the legitimate use of physical 
violence against the dominated: Symbolic violence renders its victims—whose 
contrary discourses are tacitly unrecognized and unengaged by the dominant— 
vulnerable to conservative acts of physical violence, among other forms of 
discrimination. It is through the de legitimation of the dominated's "knowledge" 
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that acts of physical violence against them are made legitimate. Symbolic violence 
is a necessary condition of possibility for the legitimate use of physical violence. 
How did the police kill sixteen Filipino strikers on the island of Kaua'i in 
1924 with unquestioned and uninterrupted legitimacy? To this day, the killings 
are more likely to be remembered, if at all, as a riot, a battle, an incident, or a 
tragedy than as a massacre. How was the nakedness of the deadly brute force 
not seen? After all, the sugar industry had paid the government for the hiring of 
hundreds of special police, many of whom took part in the massacre, specifically 
in anticipation of and response to the strike. 
Constituting common sense, or doxa, Filipinos in prewar Hawai'i were 
believed to be inferior to and by others, foremost haole. One inferior characteristic 
ascribed to Filipino men, in particular, was a natural predisposition toward 
violence. Filipino workers, however, did not internalize this dominant belief as 
common sense: there was no unanimity of doxa, no tacit agreement between the 
dominated and the dominant. Rather, leading up to and during the 1924 strike, 
Filipino workers were conscious of the dominant belief of their violent nature 
and explicitly advocated nonviolence: there was asymmetry of doxa, as the 
dominant took for granted what the dominated did not. Tacitly not recognizing 
the Filipino men's discourse and practice of nonviolence, the sugar industry and 
the territorial government together took extreme measures, including the 
stockpiling of weapons and the hiring of special police, to counter the violence 
that they could not fathom would not materialize, even as it did not materialize 
in the initial months of the strike. Believing was not seeing, or hearing. 
The preceding tacit nonrecognition, or symbolic violence, secured the 
immediate legitimacy of the police violence in Hanapçpç that took the lives of 
sixteen Filipino strikers: The legitimacy of the physical violence against them 
rested upon the "prereflexive" illegitimacy of their contrary discourse. For the 
haole elite and, as far as is known, the public at large, the massacre only confirmed 
their preexisting beliefs about Filipinos. No justification for the sixteen Filipino 
deaths was needed, because no justification was ever called for; it was self-
evident. Reproducing the symbolic violence, the Filipino strikers' discourse of 
what had happened in Hanapçpç was also ignored as a matter of course in the 
aftermath, ensuring the "open-and-shut" criminal cases against scores of Filipinos 
and legitimating, once again, the state's use of physical violence—their 
incarceration and, in many cases, deportation. 
The fact that the Hanapçpç Massacre was the deadliest conflict in Hawaii's 
labor history has led to the assumption that it was anomalous. But, as this paper 
demonstrates, the legitimate use of physical violence against Filipino workers 
was predicated on symbolic violence that "normal" unequal social relations 
produced. It is not hard to identify, either historically or contemporarily, examples 
of symbolic violence that lead to the use of physical violence whose legitimacy 
does not come into serious question. Particularly at the present historical moment, 
victims of symbolic and physical violence, foreign and domestic, are not in 
short supply. Whether they be Arabs, the poor, prisoners, Muslims, or 
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undocumented migrants, their "voicelessness"—more accurately, their unsilent 
but unheard voices85—routinely legitimates the physical violence, and other forms 
of discrimination, they face regularly. 
How is symbolic violence, and the legitimate use of physical violence that 
it makes possible, to be resisted? I suggest that one answer lies with coalition 
politics. Symbolic violence works, in part, through isolation. For example, in 
1924, Filipino workers' discourse of nonviolence was tacitly unrecognized not 
only by the haole elite and the territorial government, their direct adversaries, 
but also by many others of the non-Filipino public, even those who supported 
the strike. It is through coalitions among victims of different forms of symbolic 
violence, who may be more able to hear one another through analogical reasoning 
and empathy and therefore to construct a coherent politics, that their respective 
realms of symbolic violence may be pushed back.86 In the late 1930s and the 
1940s, Hawaii's workers formed such a coalition across extant racial divisions 
to struggle successfully against haole capitalists. One effect of the interracial 
working-class movement was that acts of physical violence against Filipino 
workers, like the Hanapçpç Massacre, could no longer take place with 
unquestioned legitimacy (Jung 2003). Likewise, to recognize and engage tacitly 
unrecognized subaltern discourses and practices and to construct meaningful 
articulations across them are some of the key opportunities and responsibilities 
of critical scholarship.87 
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1. An early use of the term, "Hanapepe Massacre," appears in Manlapit (1933:67). 
2. HSPA was the powerful decision-making body of the industry. 
3. My intention is not to minimize the killing of the four police officers. Never deemed 
legitimate, their deaths lie outside the analytical focus of this paper. 
4. Weber (1946:78; emphasis in original) defines the state as "a human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory." 
5. But, not fully redundant. Bourdieu (1994) finds doxic submission, or symbolic violence, 
as the source of legitimacy. Hence, in relation to physical violence, the presence of both "legitimate" 
and "symbolic violence" in his definition of the state appears redundant. In relation to symbolic 
violence, however, the definition's reference to its legitimate use seems to indicate not a redundancy 
but a symbolic violence of a second order: symbolically violent use of symbolic violence. But, 
exactly what that would be—or, negatively, exactly what an illegitimate use of symbolic violence 
would be—remains unclear. 
6. See Lewis (2003) for a Bourdieuian analysis of education and the reproduction of racial 
domination. 
7. Though not discussed or critiqued here, Jackman (2001) offers an original approach to 
theorizing legitimacy and violence that differs from, but also overlaps with, both Bourdieu and 
Gramsci—greatly expanding the definitional scope of violence, somewhat like Bourdieu, and 
highlighting the ways in which the dominant's ideological construction of violence conceals 
their own preferred forms of violence, somewhat like Gramsci. 
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8. "Symbolic violence is the coercion which is set up only through the consent that the 
dominated cannot fail to give to the dominator (and therefore to the domination) when their 
understanding of the situation and relation can only use instruments of knowledge that they have 
in common with the dominator, which, being merely the incorporated form of the structure of the 
relation of domination, make this relation appear as natural" (Bourdieu 2000:170). 
9 "The state does not necessarily have to give orders or to exercise physical coercion in 
order to produce an ordered social world, as long as it is capable of producing embodied cognitive 
structures that accord with objective structures and thus of ensuring the belief of which Hume 
spoke—namely, doxic submission to the established order" (Bourdieu 1994:15). 
10. For example, a child's persistent string of "why" questions points to our own 
unquestioning, or no longer questioning, assumptions about the world and, as evidenced by our 
eventual "I don't know" or irritation, to what Bourdieu refers to as their cultural arbitrariness. 
11. "All the agents in a given social formation share a set of basic perceptual schemes" 
(Bourdieu 1984:468). 
12. As a thought experiment, imagine how bizzarely newspapers and magazines would 
read, especially to whites, if "white" were used as compulsorily as "black" as an identifier. 
13. However, the datedness of all past writings—for example, their tacit assumption at the 
turn of the last century that race was real in a biological sense—attests to Bourdieu's notion of 
doxa. 
14. The degree of doxic asymmetry would be empirically variable. Complementarily, the 
degree of doxic submission would also be empirically variable. 
15. Using Du Bois's concept of double consciousness, Rawls's (2000) study of interactions 
shows how Blacks and whites often talk past each other in contentious discourse. She also finds 
that, particularly for whites, this unintelligibility is coupled with an unawareness of it. 
16. "Crisis is a necessary condition for a questioning of doxa but is not in itself a sufficient 
condition for the production of a critical discourse" (Bourdieu 1977:169). In this regard, Calhoun 
(1995; see also Sewell 1992; Wacquant 1987) rightly points out that Bourdieu's theory of practice, 
relying on exogenous crises as precipitators of change, does not allow for endogenous social 
transformations. 
17. By "conservative," I do not mean any narrowly political sense of the term. 
18. Though convincing that the state holds privileged powers of effecting symbolic violence, 
Bourdieu (1989, 1994, 1996) is less persuasive in claiming the state's monopoly of its use— 
especially beyond the French case. Rather, the degree of state control would appear to be empirically 
variable, irrespective of whether symbolic violence is thought of in Bourdieu's terms or mine. 
19. In these analyses, Bourdieu argues that agents misrecognize, for example, taste in art or 
ideal body image as personal and unrelated to social inequalities, thereby legitimating and 
contributing to their reproduction. 
20. Merry (2000) also notes the lack of focus on violence in the study of Hawai'i. See Liu 
(1985) and Okihiro (1991) for critiques of the long dominant assimilationist framework. 
21. In fact, the very prevalence of symbolic violence may have had the enduring 
epistemological effect of reproducing Hawaii's pacific image. 
22. Within the U.S. colonial scheme, "incorporated territories" like Hawai'i were accorded 
the same tariff protection as states on the continent, protection that was denied "non-incorporated 
territories" like the Philippines (Littler 1929:40-41). 
23. The total area under sugar cultivation expanded from 26,019 acres in 1880 to 254,563 
acres in 1934 (Schmitt 1977:357-60). The number of employees grew from 3,786 in 1874 to a 
peak of 57,039 in 1933 {Hawaiian Annual 1934:20; Schmitt 1977:359). Sugar production soared 
from 12,540 tons in 1875 to top one million tons three times in the 1930s {Hawaiian Annual 
1940:33; Taylor 1935:166). 
24. The "Big Five" were Alexander and Baldwin, American Factors (formerly H. Hackfeld 
and Company), C. Brewer and Company, Castle and Cooke, and T.H. Davies and Company. By 
1930, the plantations controlled by these corporations produced 95.2 percent of Hawaii's sugar 
{Hawaiian Annual 1931:132-35). 
25. Haole is the racial category in Hawai'i referring to non-Iberian people of European 
ancestry, mostly of U.S., British, and German origins. 
26. The total value of sugar exports was $74,896,568, and the total value of all exports, 
including sugar, was $108,632,223. The total value of pineapple exports was $28,292,485 
{Hawaiian Annual 1925:19, 21). 
27. Both before and after U.S. annexation, migrants from Asia were excluded from 
naturalized citizenship and the franchise on racial grounds. The term issei refers to first-generation 
migrants from Japan. Nisei refers to their children. 
28. The numbers and percentage for 1924 were based on men only, as the 3,250 women 
counted were not broken down racially. The vast majority of them were likely Japanese. 
29. John Waterhouse, presidential address, Proceedings of the Fortieth Annual Meeting of 
the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, 29-30 November 1920, p. 8, Hawaiian Collection, 
University of Hawai'i at Mânoa. 
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30. After the 1920 strike, which the haole elite and mainstream press, all but ignoring the 
Filipinos, interpreted as an anti-American movement of the Japanese to colonize Hawai'i, Japanese 
workers left the labor movement for over two decades. The most important factor for the interwar 
exodus was a redoubled, racist Americanization movement that relentlessly focused exclusively 
on the Japanese (Jung 1999; Okihiro 1991; Weinberg 1967). 
31. Much that is known about the 1924 strike from the strikers' point of view is through 
Pablo Manlapit's Filipinos Fight for Justice. Prepared in 1924 but not published until 1933, it 
contains various reprints of original documents as well as his personal recollections. 
32. "Petition to Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association" from signatories to president and 
board of directors of HSPA, [sent on 10 April 1923], as reprinted in Manlapit (1933:35-36); see 
also Pablo Manlapit and George W. Wright to the public, "Manifesto of the High Wages 
Movement," 2 January 1924, pp. 1-2, Manuel Quezon Papers, Special Collections, University of 
Hawai'i at Mânoa. 
33. "Manifesto of the High Wages Movement," p. 2. 
34. Ibid., pp. 3-5. 
35. Executive Committee of the HWM, "Strike Proclamation," 14 March 1924, as reprinted 
in Manlapit (1933:62-64). 
36. J. K. Butler to HSPA trustees and all plantation managers, 11 May 1928, PSC33/15, 
HSPA Plantation Papers, Special Collections, University of Hawai'i at Mânoa. 
37. By contrast, the Portuguese and the Japanese, the other major groups of workers in the 
1920s, were racialized as related to but distinctly inferior to haole and as inherently anti-American, 
respectively (Jung 1999). 
38. "Sixteen of the judges were plantation managers while among the remainder of the 
group were head workers of social settlements, plantation doctors, and several educationists" 
(Porteus and Babcock 1926:90). The judges' "race" went unremarked, indicating, in all likelihood, 
that they were all haole. 
39. Puerto Ricans ranked last or second to last on six of the eight ratings in the Porteus and 
Babcock study. Both the Japanese and the Chinese held similarly negative assessments of Puerto 
Ricans. Suggesting the importance of colonization in racializing a people as inferior, Puerto 
Ricans were the only other group of migrant workers to be recruited from another U.S. colony. 
40. A vast majority of Filipino workers were recruited from the Visayas and Ilocos regions 
of the Philippines. The editor of Garden Island, Kauai's main newspaper, found Visayans—the 
primary participants of the 1924 strike, especially on Kaua'i—to be particularly "quick tempered." 
In his view, one perhaps shaped by the Hanapçpç Massacre itself, Uocanos—who had "quite a bit 
of Chinese blood"—were by contrast "not belligerent at all" (Fern interview, p. 511). 
Oral history interviews, like this one, of survivors and others linked to the Hanapçpç 
Massacre, conducted and collected by the Ethnic Studies Oral History Project (ESOHP) at the 
University of Hawaii, form an invaluable resource. "[Established by legislative appropriation in 
January, 1976," the ESOHP, now known as the Center for Oral History, is charged with "recording] 
and preserv[ing]" memories of Hawaii's residents, especially those of workers (Taniguchi et al. 
1979:ix). The 1924 Filipino Strike on Kauai (ESOHP 1979) represents one of a number of such 
efforts carried out by the ESOHP. Audio recordings of interviews are available at the University 
of Hawai'i Library's Special Collections, and transcripts are available at a number of libraries in 
Hawai'i and around the continental United States. 
41. See interviews of Cabico, De la Cruz, and Gueco. See also Fuchs (1961). 
One fact that most commentators, sympathetic and unsympathetic alike, fail to note about 
the persistent association of Filipinos and knives, particularly cane knives, is that Filipino workers, 
holding the most physically taxing and lowest paid positions on the plantations, were predominantly 
the ones in the field actually cutting and handling cane. 
42. See also Kojiri interview, p. 585; Ogawa interview, p. 223. 
43. Hawaii Hochi also carried editorials in support of the strike (Reinecke 1996:168). 
Filipino strikers on Kaua'i likewise remembered that some Japanese and Chinese businesses 
supplied food and money during the strike. See interviews of Agbayani, Anonymous A and Oroc, 
Cabinatan, Ganade, Lutao, P. Ponce, and Venyan and Juabot. 
44. Kojiri interview, p. 585. The quotation is attributed to "SK," Kojiri's wife. 
45. Behind the strikers' specific demands was a broader opposition to the lowly treatment 
of Filipinos, who were "treated like animals," according to a striker (Lagmay interview, p. 173). 
A nurse at the time of the strike, a Filipina later recalled that "in those days like that, you were 
paid according to the color of your skin" (Cortezan interview, p. 433). 
46. Executive Committee of the High Wage Movement, 14 March 1924, as reprinted in 
Manlapit (1933:62-64). 
47. Ibid. 
48. Anonymous B interview, p. 848. See also Kerkvliet (2002:48-49). 
49. Anonymous A and Oroc interview, p. 779. 
50. The strike up to that point had not been completely free of violence, but it had been 
probably less, certainly no more, violent than other major strikes in Hawaii's history. 
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51. P. Ponce interview, p. 286. 
52. Kojiri interview, p. 585; the second quotation is attributed to "SK," Kojiri's wife. 
53. Beechert (1985:220); Theo. H. Davies to John T. Moir, 26 June 1924, H.A. Walker to 
John T. Moir, 27 June 1924, and J. K. Butler to plantation managers on Hawai'i, 5 August 1924, 
MKC1/8, HSPA Plantation Papers, Special Collections. 
54. Bulletin to plantation managers of Kauai, Maui, and Hawai'i, 17 April 1924, as quoted 
in Beechert (1985:220). 
55. J. K. Butler to plantation managers on Hawai'i and Maui, 6 June 1924, MKC1/8, HSPA 
Plantation Papers, Special Collections. See also Kerkvliet (2002:49). 
56. J. K. Butler, as quoted in Honolulu Times, 8 August 1924, in Reinecke (1996:3). 
57. Oral history accounts of the strikers in Hanapçpç vary with regard to the two Ilocanos. 
They were plantation spies or passers-by; treated well or beaten; and convinced to stay and strike 
or frightened into silence. For examples, see interviews of Anonymous B, Ganade, Lagmay, and 
Venyan and Juabot. See also endnote 40 concerning distinctions between Ilocanos and Visayans 
sometimes drawn by haole. 
58. For the deputy sheriff 's account, as told to his son, see Crowell interview, p. 223. 
59. Acting Adjutant General E. M. Bolton to Farrington, 22 September 1924, as quoted in 
Reinecke (1996:76). 
60. According to the recollections of the then Garden Island reporter, neither the Honolulu 
Advertiser nor the Honolulu Star-Bulletin sent reporters to Kaua'i. Apparently, they both received 
the story from the Garden Island, the former directly and the latter via the Advertiser and Associated 
Press. Fern interview, pp. 534-535. 
61. A.W.T. Bottomley, A Statement Concerning the Sugar Industry in Hawaii; Labor 
Condition on Hawaiian Sugar Plantations; Filipino Laborers Thereon, and the Alleged Filipino 
"Strike " of 1924, November 1924, pp. 43-44, Hawaiian Collection. Bottomley wrote this pamphlet 
as the president of the HSPA. 
62. A.W.T. Bottomley, presidential address, Proceedings of the Forty-fourth Annual Meeting 
of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters' Association, 17-20 November 1924, pp. 14-15, Hawaiian 
Collection. 
63. Reinecke (1996:79); C. Ponce interview, p. 308. Even a sympathetic historian like 
Reinecke (1996:36) writes, "Widespread purchase by Filipinos of cheap mail order handguns 
caused worry, which at Hanapepe was justified by the event." 
64. Kojiri interview, p. 585; the first sentence quoted is attributed to "SK," Kojiri's wife. 
Kojiri had been a taxi driver who took to Hanapçpç, on 9 September 1924, some of the police 
later involved in the violence. 
65. Reinecke (1996); Cortezan interview, p. 431; ESOHP (1979:A-6); Fern interview, p. 
526. 
66. There is a bias to ESOHP's (1979) interview sample: "It does not include those convicted 
and later deported or those who became dissatisfied with plantation life on Kauai and left. It 
includes those found not guilty and released, by definition only peripherally involved in the 
strike organization and decision making, and those who for whatever reasons elected to stay on 
Kauai" (Taniguchi et al. 1979:xi). In all likelihood, then, the discourse of Filipino strikers on 
Kaua'i as a whole was even more at odds with the dominant discourse than presented here. 
67. P. Ponce interview, p. 287. He added, "That's what made it so difficult, when we were 
on strike before. Because our enemies were not only the plantations, but the police themselves" 
(Ponces interview, p. 323). 
68. Anonymous A and Oroc interview, p. 771; Anonymous B interview, p. 851; Cabinatan 
interview, p. 65; Ganade interview, p. 104; Lagmay interview, p. 195; Plateros interview, pp. 
355-356, 360; Venyan interview, p. 811. 
69. Oroc in Anonymous A and Oroc interview, p. 795. See also C. Ponce interview, pp. 
307-308; P. Ponce interview, p. 294. 
70. Anonymous A in Anonymous A and Oroc interview, p. 795. 
71. Ganade interview, p. 104. 
72. Anonymous B interview, p. 849. See also Ganade interview, p. 85; Lagmay interview, 
p. 171. 
73. Anonymous A in Anonymous A and Oroc interview, p. 771. 
74. Runes interview. 
75. Faye interview, pp. 470-473. In 1924, Lindsay Faye, and his fellow plantation managers, 
no doubt would have found it impossible that he would end up agreeing with Manlapit's (1933:67) 
interpretation: "The Hanapepe Massacre, in which four police officers were killed and 16 Filipinos 
lost their lives. An unnecessary slaughter by sharp-shooters placed in ambush, using soft-nosed 
bullets on men who were trying to escape." 
76. Fern interview, pp. 523-525. 
77. Ibid., p. 526. Charles Fern attributed his lack of shock in 1924 to professional focus. 
78. Fern interview, p. 534. 
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79. Venyan and Juabot interview, p. 825; Bakiano interview, p. 621; Heller (1951). 
80. Bakiano interview, p. 608. See also Fern interview, p. 534. 
81. Determining that those who killed the four police officers were themselves killed in the 
conflict, the authorities did not charge anyone with homicide. 
82. The Honolulu Star-Bulletin was particularly inclined toward this view (Reinecke 
1996:81-83). 
83. Perhaps indicative of the "open-and-shut" nature of the case, newspaper reporting was 
"very scanty" (Reinecke 1996:85). 
84. Anonymous B interview, p. 859; Ganade interview, pp. 90, 99; Plateros interview, p. 
366; Rivera interview, p. 898. The exact number of deportations remains unclear. 
85. As Mae Henderson writes about Black women, "It is not that black women . . . have had 
nothing to say, but rather that they have had no say" (1989:24 as quoted in Collins 1998:44). 
86. The Japanese in prewar Hawai'i confronted a different racialized form of symbolic 
violence, based on the unshakable belief of their anti-Americanism, that isolated them. 
87. But, engagement should not be confused with uncritical acceptance, however well 
intentioned, for even a second sight leaves many blind spots. 
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